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CHAPTER3 
BALANCING COMPETING INDIVIDUAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: RAISING SOME QUESTIONS 
Tazmya Lovell Banks 
"[L]aw is a compromise of contending forces and interests in society."1 
Introduction: The Debate about Constitutionalizing Socio-economic 
Rights 
In 1996 United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsbmg noted that 
many of the more thru1 200 new constitutions adopted since 1970 contain guarantees 
of socio-economic rights like housing, health care and education. But, she opined, 
Americru1s would quickly reject runending their Constitution to include these rights.1 
The Justice reminded her audience that in 1944 President Frrulklin D. Roosevelt 
urged the enactment of a "second bill of rights" that would take care of hmnan needs 
because "necessitous men are not free men."3 And for a brief period, as American 
constitutional scholar Cass Stmstein points out, the Warren Court quietly, but 
tmsuccessfully, attempted to move the cmmtry in that direction.~ Instead of 
constitutionalizing socio-economic rights the United States chose a federal-state 
arrangement of entitlements, many of which have been, or currently are being, 
dismantled by a hostile executive and congress. Without constitutional protection 
socio-economic benefits once conferred easily can be withdrawn. 
Despite increasing support for global hmnan rights, as exemplifi,~J. by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5 and the International Covenru1t 
on Economic and Cultural Rights,6 some scholars and constitutional democracies, 
like the United States, continue to resist constitutionalizing socio-economic rights. 
Socio-economic rights, unlike political and civil constitutional rights that usually 
prohibit govennnent actions, are thought to impose positive obligations on 
govennnent. As a result, constitutionalizing socio-economic rights raises questions 
about separation of powers and the competence of cotnis to decide traditionally 
legislative and executive matters.7 
Stmstein, writing about the late twentieth centmy constitutions in Eastern 
Europe, also argued that constitutionalizing socio-economic rights compels 
governments to interfere with free markets.3 He even argued, somewhat 
patronizingly, that constitutionalizing socio-economic rights "may promote attitudes 
?f welfare-dependen~ and become a cmmterincentive to self-reliance and 
mdividual initiative.' Others argue that the inherent difficulty in judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights weakens public faith that constitutional rights 
will be enforced. 10 
Concerns about the enforceability of rights even plague those cmmtries whose 
~onstitutions protect only political and civil rights. Most cmrrts find it difficult to 
lllstrre equality when faced with competing constitutional rights claims. In Gennany, 
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for example, the Constitutional Comi in reconciling conflicting constitutional rights 
refers to the structural tmity of its constitution applying "the principle of 'practical 
concordance' (praktische Konkordan:::)" by which conflicting cm1stitutional rights 
are "harmonized" and balanced so that each is "preserved in creative tension with 
one another. " 11 
Thus there are no absolute rights. 1 ~ The Gennan Constitutional Court in 
ham10nizing and balancing conflicting constitutional rights has created a de facto 
hierarchy of rights. As a result, the jurisprudence of that court is incm1sisteut and 
tmpredictable. Smnetin1es the cotni's jm;sprudence rests on rigorous analysis, and 
other times m1 bewildering ex cathedra pronotmcemeuts. 13 
Another approach to the balancing problem adopted by the United States 
Supreme Cotni, muong others, is to create a fomml hierarchy of cm1stitutional rights 
pt;vileging smne individual rights over others. First Amendment rights, including 
ti-eedmn of association, are considered ftmdmnental rights, whereas the right to 
equal protection of law is not Yet this fonnal hierarchy is not absolute. There are a 
few exceptimtal cases where the StqJreme Cotni prefers a non-ftmdmnental right 
over a so-called fmtdmneutal right 
Perhaps the most well-known exmnple is the US. Supreme Cotni's seminal 1954 
decisim1, Brown v. Board of Education_ 1 ~ In Brown the right of black Americans to 
equality tmder law in access to public education was protected at the expense of the 
associatimtal rights of white Americans hostile to being educated with blacks. Smne 
constitutional scholars, while applauding the demise of the separate but equal 
docnllie, complained about the cotni's depmiure from its articulated hierarchy of 
rights. 
Legal scholar Herbert Wechsler in a 1959 essay about the Brown decision wrote: 
[A]ssmning equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segregation is 
not one of discrimination at alL Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie 
entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that 
in1pinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be involved _ _ _ . 
But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an 
association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant Is this not the heart of 
the issue involved, a conflict in human claims of high dimension, not unlike many 
others that involve the highest freedoms .... 15 
Constitutional scholars raised similar questions about the US. Supreme Comi's 
departure frmn its stated hierarch/' of constitutional ri~ts in the restrictive 
covenants cases, Shelly v. Krmner1 and Jones v. Maver. 1 ' Neil Gotanda writes: 
"Legal scholars who believed in a constitutionally required freedmn of contract and 
private sector right to discriminate (subject to certain resn;ctions), fotmd [the 
Supreme Court's refttsal to enforce racially] restrictive coveum1t[s] ... hard to 
justifY. " 18 The questions raised by Herbert Wechsler and other American 
constitutional scholm·s about these exceptional departures frm11 the accepted fonnal 
hierarchy of rights, continue to generate discussion today within academic circles. 
As Justice Ginsbm·g suggests, the American constitutim1 once a model of modem 
constitutions, looks m1tiquated next to late twentieth centmy models like the South 
Africm1 Constitution. That comttry' s constitutionalizing of socio-econmnic rights, 
while the United States gradually dismm1tled much of the New Deal and 1960s 
socio-ecm1mnic progrmns, caused Cass Stmstein to recmtsider his position m1 
cm1stitutionalizing those rights. 19 The transfonnative nature of the South Africm1 
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Constitution is evident in the docmnent's repeated references to the protection of 
hmnan rights. ~o 
But when transitional democracies, like South Africa, choose to constitutionalize 
socio-economic rights, cotuis inevitably rnust grapple with their role in the 
realization of those rights_ Where cotuis have both declaratory and enforcement 
obligations tmder the constitution, a connnitment to human rights, while laudable, 
may be difficult to attain. Two questions inm1ediately come to mind: ( l) whether it 
is possible to treat conflicting constitutional rights equally, or whether a hierarchy of 
rights, either fonnal or infom1al, is m1 inevitable result; mtd (2) whether in a true 
participatory democracy cotuis should be placed in the position of detem1ining this 
hierarchy of constitutional rights, or whether the ordering of rights is m1 inherently 
political task.=1 
A related question is whether when vast socio-economic inequities exists muong 
the citizenry a judicial approach is more appropriate lllltil that society has reduced 
those inequities. Citizens who lack adeqtmte food, shelter m1d basic education are 
disadvm1taged politically even in the most liberal democracy. A nation-state's 
approach to these questions is reflected in the mechmtisms adopted to enforce socio-
economic rights. 
Modern state constitutions that incorporate socio-economic rights usually adopt 
one of three approaches to enforceability of these rights. Some constitutions treat 
socio-economic rights as judicially enforceable, the smne as other individual 
rights.== Other constitutions distinguish socio-economic rights from political and 
civil rights by making the fonuer non-justiciable aspirational targets for the 
legislature and executive branches_:!3 Still other constitutions adopt a middle position 
designating some socio-economic rights as justiciable m1d others not~ 
The South African Constitutional Cmui was mindful of the controversy 
surrounding constitntionalizing socio-economic rights. 15 Fonner Constitutional 
Cmui Justice Richard Goldstone writes that the comi "has successfully enforced the 
constitution's provisions for social and economic rights while balm1cing the state's 
interest in managing its political affairs. "=6 He rejects as a false dichotomy the 
distinction mmty legal scholars mtd jurists draw between socio-economic mtd civil 
or political rights arguing that enforcement of both sets of rights often involves 
expenditures of public fimds, citing as an exmnple the costs of school bussing to 
enforce the US. Supreme Cotui's integration mm1date in Brown v. Board of 
Education.17 But, as mentioned previously, even Arnericm1 scholars concede that 
Brown was an exceptional case. Thus the South Africmt Constitutional Court's 
treatment of socio-economic constitutional rights during its first decade of existence 
merits closer scmtiny. 
When modem democracies like South Africa constitutionalize socio-economic 
rights and declare these rights justiciable, judicial enforcement is an issue. 13 This 
chapter argues that some hierarchy of rights that privileges one set of rights over 
another is inevitable, especially where neither the state constitution nor the cmui 
clearly creates a fonnal hierm·chy of rights_ It uses the right to housing cases decided 
during the Constitutional Cmui's first decade to explore this question. 
Enforcing Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
_ The South Africa Constitution provides that everyone, citizen m1d non-citizen19, 
Is entitled to reasonable access to health care, food, water, social security, housing 
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and education. 30 The Constitution also prohibits government from carrying out 
arbitrary evictions or refusing emergency medical treatment. 31 Although phrased in 
the negative, these last two provisions compliment or reinforce the positive socio-
economic rights to housing and health care. Also reinforcing these socio-economic 
rights are the constitutional rights to equality, lnunan dignity and life31 which 
impose restraints as well as affmnative obligations on govenunent. But the 
Constitution also qualifies some socio-economic rights like access to housing and 
health care by explicitly providing that those rights are to be progressively realized 
"within available resom·ces" of govenunene3 
In early decisions interpreting socio-economic rights, the Constitutional Cmui 
addressed many questions raised by opponents of constitutionalizing socio-
economic rights. It sought to assuage separation of powers concerns by noonalizing 
the enforcement of socio-economic rights saying that courts traditionally make 
decisions that have budgetary implications. Thus the enforcement of socio-
economic rights is not substantially different from judicial tasks nonnally conferred 
on cotuis by a bill of rights. 3-1 Therefore, tmder the South African Constitution all 
socio-economic rights are, with certain limitations, justiciable.35 
Conceding justiciability raises two important questions: what standard of review 
is approptiate in reviewing constitutional socio-economic rights claims, and how do 
com1s enforce these rights when violated by govenunent. These are difficult 
questions that the Constitutional Cotui says "must be carefully explored on a case-
by-case basis. "36 Addressing the appropriate standard of review the court initially 
adopted, and then discarded, a rationality test. In Soobrarnoney v. Minister of 
Health, Justice Chaskalson wrote that "[a] cmui will be slow to interfere with 
rational decisions taken in good faith by ... authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters. "37 
In Soobramoney the court ruled that access to dialysis treatment could be 
restricted because of limited govemment resources and not violate the right to health 
care. The court said that limiting dialysis treatment to individuals eligible for a 
kidney transplant was a rationale policy decision. But application of a rationale basis 
standard results in an extremely deferential attitude toward those governmental 
entities responsible for health care decisions. This minimal review standard also 
seems inconsistent with the transfonnative view of the new South African 
Constitution and Constitutional Com1. 
Four years later in Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, a seminal socio-
economic rights case, the court replaced the rationality test with a reasonableness 
test,38 a more demanding standard. Tims the issue when socio-economic rights are 
asserted is whether "the measures taken by the state to realize the right . . . are 
reasonable."39 The exact meaning of reasonable, however, is to be worked out case-
by-case. The reasonableness test as annmmced seems an ad hoc and somewhat 
tmpredictable approach to constitutional decision-making. Undoubtedly the cmui 
adopted this cautious approach rnindful of separation of powers concerns. Arguably, 
a reasonableness standard preserves executive and legislative prerogatives in 
detennining how limited financial resources should be allocated. 
Scholars characterize the com1' s reasonableness test as an "administrative law" 
approach to the adjudication of socio-econmnic rights.-10 TI1e unit of government 
whose policy is challenged, and to whmn the Constitution assigns the resp011sibility, 
nmst explain the rationale for its policy- why it prioritized the allocati011 of its 
lunited resom·ces the way it did. TI1e court's role is 011e of oversight muy, namely to 
guard against ''tmreas011able" resom-ce allocation. 
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Separation of powers concems also may explain the court's resistance to 
argmnents for a minimtn11 core of socio-economic rights.~ 1 The United Nations 
Committee General Comment 3 states: "a mininnnn core obligation to ensure the 
satisfaction o( at the very least, mininunn essential levels of each of the rights is 
iucmnbent upon every State party. "~1 Although amicus briefs in Grootboom argued 
for a minim1m1 core obligation, the Constitutional Court, for the moment at least, 
rejects this argmnent. -13 Justice Y acoob writes that the court does not have enough 
iufonnation "to detenuine the minim1m1 threshold for the progressive realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and 
opportmuties for the enjoyment of such a right."~ 
At the smne time the court concedes that there might be circm11Stm1ces where this 
type of inquiry would be appropriate . .IS Since, as the comi acknowledges, lack of 
shelter cm1 result in the denial of "htm1m1 dignity, freedom and equality ,"-16 it is 
instructive to look at whether, when balm1cing the rights of private property owners 
against the access to housing rights of lm1dless people, the Constitutional Court 
tends to favor the fonuer or latter. In other words, the inquiry is whether the court, 
in fact rather than by fonual policy, treats access to housing for homeless society 
members as a nunimmu core obligation. 
Access to Housing: Grootboom as Setting the Stage 
In a series of cases the South Africa Constitutional Court explored one aspect of 
the access to housing right - the protection against arbitrary evictions. During the 
apartheid era arbitrary evictions by government and third pmiies were 
cmmnonplace, and disproportionately affected non-whites.~7 Mindful of this 
1m.fortunate past, section 26(3) of the Bill of Rights provides: "No one may be 
evicted frmn their home, or have their hmne demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all of the relevant circmnstances. No legislation may pennit 
arbitrary evictions." The Constitutional Court acknowledges that section 26 (3) is 
designed to prevent apartheid-type evictions and property-related injustices from 
recmring in the new South Africa .lS 
Debates about whether to preserve common law property rights persisted 
throughout drafting of the new South Africa Cm1stitution. Ultimately, 
nationalization of land was rejected. Instead, the Bill of Rights protects both 
'~existing entrenched rights m1d privileges ... [while] extending 'the enjoyment of 
nghts to all. '"~9 
The protection of property rights is contained in section 25 of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 25 (1) provides: "No one may be deprived of property except in tenus of 
law of general application, and no law may pennit arbitrary deprivation of 
property." Under secti011 25 (2) "[p]roperty may be expropriated m1ly in tenus of 
law of general application - for a public purpose or in the public interest" m1d 011ly 
where the landowner has been compensated. Unanswered by sections 25 and 26 is 
how to balance the rights of hmneless society . members with those of private 
property owners, some of whmn acquired land during the apartheid era 50 
Specifically, the question is whether the dignity and access to housing rights of 
South Africans include the right not to be left homeless and if so, whether the 
enforcement of these rights often will occur at the expense of private landowners. 
. The South African Constitutional Court in Grootboom said in passing that the 
nght of access to housing contained in section 26( l) implicitly imposes, "at the very 
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least, a negative obligation ... upon the state and all other entities and persons to 
desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to housing."51 (emphasis 
added) Whether this negative constitutional obligation to take no action that would 
leave individuals homeless applies horizontally to non-govemmental entities is left 
tmresolved.5: Other language in Grootboom can be read either way. The 
Constitutional Court said, for example, that in addition to the State "other agents 
within om society, including individuals themselves, must be enabled by legislative 
and other meastrres to provide housing. "53 Since the court's role in these cases is 
oversight, not policymaking, the comi's language seems ptrrposefully vague 
deferring to those branches of the State assigned the responsibility by the 
Constitution of detennining the means of fulfilling the govemrnent's housing 
obligation. 
When the State fails to provide access to adequate housing for those members of 
society most in need, individuals are forced to resort to self-help meastrres, like land 
invasions. h1 ttrrn land owners whose property is invaded, to protect their rights, 
must initiate ejectment proceedings against the mllawful occupants. But tmder 
Section 8 ( l) of the South African Constitution, courts are considered state actors, so 
they are botmd by provisions of the Bill of Rights, including section 26, when 
issuing ejectrnent orders. As a result, according to GeoffBudlender, a ''court may .. . 
stay the eviction to a stipulated date ... to enable the evictees to find another place .. . 
[to] live ... [or] order an eviction conditional upon the state's first fmding m10ther 
place where the evictees may settle. "5~ Tlms the right of a propetiy owner to eject 
squatters is qualified. Grootboom illustrates some of resulting problems faced by 
property owners in this situation. 
fu Grootboom htmdreds of adults and children living in an infonnal community 
tmder intolerable conditions moved on to vacant privately owned property 
designated for govenunent subsidized low-cost housing and built makeshift hmnes 
rather than wait indefinitely for better housing.55 The landowner obtained an 
eviction order frmn the magistrate comi but Mrs. Grootbomn and the others resisted 
saying that they would be homeless if evicted. 56 Nevertheless, they were forcibly 
evicted dtrring harsh weather and tmder conditions retniniscent of "apartheid-style 
evictions. "57 They sued alleging, among other things, that they were being denied 
access to housing as guaranteed by section 26 of the South African Constitution. 58 
In Grootbomn Justice Yacoob notes that the post-apartheid govenuuent, 
consistent with section 26 (2), was making progress in addressing the housing 
probletu. 59 Had the comi applied the rationality test atlllotmced in Soobramoney the 
court tnight have cmtcluded that the government's decision to focus on penuanent 
rather than tempormy housing could be justified as rational. But applying a 
reasonableness stmtdard the Constitutional Court fomtd that the govenuuent housing 
platJ was mueasonable and fell short of its constitutional obligation60 because it did 
not provide tempormy housing for society mernbers living in "intolerable 
conditions" or ctisis situations. 61 To make matters worse, the Cape Metro Cotmcil, 
the government entity respmtsible for housing, took no action after it becmue awm·e 
of the squatters, mtd its inactim1 allowed the settlement to grow substantially.6: So 
the problem in Grootboom was the result of a two-fold failtrre by government of its 
constitutional obligatim1. 
Tl1e court, in passing, also noted that the state may have failed to have executed 
the evictions of the plaintiffs in a hmuane manner. Sectim1 26 (3) prohibits 
tmreasonable evictimts. In detemuning whether to grmtt atl ejection order the comi 
must consider all the "relevmtt circmnstances." An importm1t factor in detennitung 
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the reasonableness of an eviction is whether the evictees will be left homeless. 63 But 
since this issue was not raised by the plaintiffs in Grootboom the court did not rule 
011 the reasonableness of the evictions_"~ Thus the Grootboom case did not squarely 
pit the tight of private property owners against the tight to housing for the poorest of 
the poor. Mrs. Grootboom m1d the other plaintiffs already had been ejected. But the 
C011stitutional Comi's decision in that case suggested that private lmtdowners might 
have difficulty ejecting some tmlawful occupants. 
Balancing the Rights of Landless and Landowners 
TI1e Grootboom decision triggered a vigorous debate within South Africa about 
its impact on common law lm1downer rights. 65 Legal scholars wondered whether the 
C011stitutional Court was saying that the new constitution modified common law 
property ntles by limiting the power of cmnis to order m1 otherwise lawfttl eviction 
because of the impact on those ejected. 66 Six months after Grootboom m10ther case, 
Minister of Public Works v. Kyalmni Ridge, raised a similar issue mtd provided 
some insights on the question. But once more the court was not squarely faced with 
a case that directly pitted the rights of private landowners against landless 
individuals. 
Kyalmni Ridge involved 300 people in Alexandra Township outside of 
Johmmesburg who lost their housing due to flooding. hutially the flood victims 
were given temporary shelter "in overcrowded mtd tmhealthy circmnstances without 
sufficient water mtd sanitation. "67 Subsequently the govenunent, responding to the 
cmni's mandate in Grootbomn, allocated money to provide temporary housing on 
state-owned lm1d located near an affluent white neighborhood. The neighboring 
property owners, who had not been consulted about the relocation beforehand, 
objected, raising envirmunental cmtcems and questioning the authority of 
govenunent to act without a public meeting. When the landowners obtained an order 
from the High Comi to stop the construction, the govemment, joined by a flood 
victim, appealed, m1d the Constitutional Cmni reversed the order. 68 
The property owners conceded that govenunent has an obligation to act 
reasonably to provide adequate access to housing for the flood victims, but argued 
that the proposed relocation would adversely affect their property values. 69 The 
Constitutim1al Comi rejected their argmnent saying that the interests of neighboring 
landowners were insufficient to constitute a cmtstitutional violation.70 h1stead the 
cmrrt treated the matter like a cmmnm1 law nuisance claim. Thus the cmni reasm1ed 
that the neighboring property owners had no right to object to another landowner's 
reasonable use of its property, even when it adversely affected neighboring property 
owners. 71 The State, like any private landowner, could make reasonable use of its 
property and that was what it was doing. 7~ 
Theoretically, however, the State in this instance really was not acting like a 
cmmnm1 law lm1downer because it has m1 affinnative obligation tmder the 
Constitution to assist hmneless or intolerably housed residents find adequate 
~ousing. 73 Tins cm1stitutim1al obligatim1 tnunped the cmtflicting, but tangential, 
nghts of the neighboring lm1downers. Despite the absence of m1y direct itnpact on 
Private property rights, the comi vohmteers that in recm1ciling conflicting 
constitutional rights, "proportionality wltich is inherent in the Bill of Rights is 
relevant to detenniuing what faimess requires. ''7~ 
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If proportionality is the rneasme of how to strike the balance between competing 
constitutional rights, then the rights of private property owners will almost always 
have to give way to the tights of poor homeless persons or poor people living in 
intolerable conditions. This approach seems consistent with the overall goal of the 
South African Constitution to ensme that the government brings about the 
progressive realization of socio-economic rights. As the Comi in Grootboom says, 
'Those whose needs are the most mgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights ... is 
most in petil, must not be ignored by the measmes aimed at achieving realisation of 
the right. "75 
Mass land invasions by hmneless members of South African society have 
become more commonplace as dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the 
govemment' s housing program increases. Anticipating South Africans' increasing 
frustration about govemment's slow response to the housing problem the 
Constitutional Court in Grootboom warned the State that if "people in desperate 
need are left without any fonn of assistance with no end of sight .... [t]he consequent 
pressure on existing settlements inevitably results in land invasions by the 
desperate."76 Tllis is exactly what happened after Grootboom. 
Three years after that decision the housing situation in the area had detetiorated 
because the govemment still had not prioritized emergency or temporary housing 
for the poorest of the poor in allocating its linlited financial resources. 77 When the 
City of Cape Town, the successor to the govenm1ent entity in Grootboom, applied 
to evict land invaders from a public park, a High Court judge, while condennling 
land invasions, refused the city's application. 78 The High Court judge noted when 
Grootboom was decided the house backlog was 206,000 houses and this mnnber 
was being reduced by 2000 housing tnlits per year.79 But by November 2001 the 
backlog had grown to 250,000 houses, and the backlog was increasing at a rate of 
15,000 ammally. Ftniher "[t]he yearl;y demand was growing by 25,000 tmits as 
against a supply of 10,000 per year. "80 The housing crisis had become even more 
severe. But like Kyalami Ridge, the land invasion in tllis lower cotni case involved 
public, not private land so no ptivate property rights were at issue. Nevertheless, the 
import of this cmni' s reading of the Grootboom mandate was clear. When 
govennnent fails to fulfill its obligation tmder section 26 to provide adequate 
temporary housing for people most in need of shelter, they cam10t be evicted from 
land they occtqJy muawfully if they will be left homeless. 
Fom years after Grootboom the Constitutional Cotni in Port Elizabeth 
Mtnlicipality v. Various Occupiers squarely faced the problem of balancing the 
interests of property owners and homeless tmlawful occupants who invade private 
lands.81 Here 68 people, including 23 children, had been living in an infonnal 
connmnlity on private property located within the Mtmicipality of Port Elizabeth for 
two to eight years. The property owners and their neighbors, a total of 1600 people, 
appealed to the city to evict the squatters. 
The unlawful occupants agree to leave if "given reasonable notice and provided 
with suitable altemate land." 8~ But the pmiies could not agree upon a suitable 
existing housing site, mtd the mmlicipality resisted building housing for the 
squatters. The govemment m·gued that the squatters would be "queue-jm11ping", 
benefiting from their tmlawful conduct at the expense of law abiding individuals 
equally in need of housing. 83 T11e Supreme Cmni of Appeals set aside the High 
Comi's ejectment order because the tmlawful occtqJants would be homeless if 
evicted, and the mtmicipality appealed to the Constitutional Comi. Thus the issue of 
conflicting constitutional rights was squarely frmned. 
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The Constitutional Comi recognized that the protection of property rights in 
section 25, and the housin~ <md eviction rights in section 26 of the Bill of Rights 
"are closely intertwined,"~-' but noted that tmder the new Constitution r.rivate 
property t;ghts are qualified and "subject to societal considerations." , A 
consideration that courts must take into accmmt when interpreting section 25 rights 
is the need to redress "the grossly tmequal distribution of land" which is a legacy of 
the apartheid era. so But exactly how the new constitution reconfigures conventim1al 
views of private property rights remains tmclear. ~7 TI1e only guidance is that the end 
goal in striking this balancing of rights, according to the court, is the affirmation of 
"the values of htn11m1 dignity, equality m1d freedmn "Ss hwoking these values as 
components of section 26 (3) restrictions on evictions automatically establishes a 
basis for smne infonnal rmlking or hierarchy of rights. This qualification also 
sOlmds a lot like the balm1cing lm1guage used by the Gennm1 Constitutional Court. 
According to Justice Sachs the role of the court in cases where these two rights 
are in cmlflict is "to balance out m1d reconcile the opposed claims in as just a 
manner as possible taking accmmt of all the interests involved and the specific 
factors relevant in each particular case_"s9 TI1e end result in these cases seems clear, 
if the tmlawful occupants will be left hmneless, eviction is unlikely. As Geoff 
Budlender predicted, mllawful occupants will remain 011 the private property tmtil 
the govemment fmds suitable altemate housing. 
The tmlawful occupants in Port Elizabeth Mtmicipality lived in a relatively 
settled cmmnunity, thus Justice Sachs reasoned, courts should be "reluctant" to 
issue ejectment orders unless reasonable altemative housing or land is available. 90 
Reflecting the court's growing frustration with govenunent's housing progrmn, m1d 
the complex balm1cing required in the ejectment cases he opined: "[t]he judiciary 
cannot of itself correct all the systemic unfairness to be fmmd in our society .... [but] 
it ... [can] soften and minimise the degree of injustice and inequity which the 
eviction of the weaker pmiies in conditions of inequality of necessity entails. "91 
But in these cases the private lm1downer is caught in the middle, tmable to eject 
tmlawful occupants tmtil the government provides suitable housing. The adverse 
effect on individual property rights is not mitigated by the court's characterizing the 
eviction provisions of section 26~3) as "defensive rather than affmnative," a 
negative rather than a positive right. 1 Under the Constitutim1al Court's rationale the 
property rights of private landowners will be restricted or subject to limitations 1m til 
the housing situation in the cOlmtry is more equal. 
In the abstract this outcmne seems like a reasm1able cmnpromise given the 
alternative, nationalization of private property and more equitable redistributim1 by 
the govennnent. But the reality of having an infonnal settlement of strangers in your 
backyard for years must be disquieting for lm1dowuers. For the mmnent, at least, 
private property rights must gave way whenever the choice is between leaving 
groups of people hmneless and protecting a property owner's right to use his or her 
property. Homeless individuals will prevail and thus m1 infonnal hierarchy is 
created that privileges the right of temporary housing for hm11eless individuals over 
the right of private property owners to eject tmlawful occupants. 
The Constitutional Court in a more recent decision illustrates how application of 
the court's balancing approach tries to minimize the adverse affects on private 
landowners. In President of the Republic of South Africa v. Modderklip, 
approximately 40,000 individuals were living on approximately 50 hectares 
(approximately 123 acres) of the Modderklip Compm1y's land. 93 h1 the 1990s the 
squatters had moved from m1 overcrowded township to a neighboring infonnal 
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settlement from which they subsequently were evicted by the nnmicipality_ They 
moved onto the Modderklip property in May 2000, believing it to be public land_ 
The nnmicipality notified the company saying that the law required the company to 
institute ejectment proceedings_ 9~ 
Given the munber of tmlawful occupants Modderklip believed that the ejectment 
proceeding was a govemment responsibility, and initially declined to sue for an 
order. 95 The company also tried, without success, to sell the occtqJied land to the 
numicipality_ Finally, Modderklip sought and obtained an ejectrnent order within the 
legally established time limits. But the cost of executing the order and lack of an 
altemate settlement for the squatters caused the order not to be effectuated. 
Frustrated the company sought relief in the court on constitutional grOtmds. 
Modderklip claimed that its propetiy rights mtder section 25 (I), as reinforced by 
section 7(2) of the Constitution, had been infiinged Section 7(2) provides that "the 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights." The 
company also alleged that the rights of the tmlawful occupants to adequate housing 
mtder section 26 had been violated. In other words, the govennnent's failure to 
comply with its housing obligations tmder section 26 also resulted in a violation of 
the landowner's propetiy rights as protected by section 25.96 The govennnent 
cotmtered that the case presented no constitutionally enforceable infringement of 
property rights because the controversy was between ptivate parties. 97 But a 
tmanimous Constitutional Court disagreed.98 
The COlni acknowledged that tmder the Constitution private property owners are 
primarily responsible for protecting their property. 99 Tims Modderklip could not sit 
idly by and leave a mass invasion of its land tmchallenged. Wllile once more 
condemning land invasions, the comi reaffin11ed govemment's affmnative duty 
tmder section 26 to ''progressively _ _ _ ensure access to housing or land for the 
homeless. " 100 Acting Cillef Justice Langa writes sympathetically: "I am nlindful of 
the fact that those charged with the provision of housing face immense problems. __ _ 
[Nevertheless] the progressive realization of access to adequate housing. __ requires 
careful planning and fair procedures made known in advance to those most 
affected. " 101 
At the same tinte govennnent is obligated to provide more than the legal 
mechmlisms and institutions to enforce Modderklip's propetiy rights. 101 In tills case 
the COlni concluded that an awm·d of compensatmy datnages was approp1iate. 1 03 
Arguably, there had been a de facto expropriation of the cmnpany' s lattd caused by 
the govennnent failure to provide tempormy housing in accordance with the 
Grootbomn nl.andate and thus compensation was warranted_ Rather thatt construing 
tills result as evidence that socio-ecmtmnic rights might be horizontally enforceable, 
the comi characterizes the situation in Modderklip as "extraordinmy."10~ 
Unforttmately, the land invasi011 at issue in Modderklip is fm· fi·orn extraordinmy. 
A quick glance through atty South Afucatt newspaper indicates that mass land 
invasions by homeless individuals m·e increasing and wide-spread. For the moment 
at least, the Constitutional Comi continues to side-step the questi011 of whether 
propetiy rights mtder section 25 are hmizmttaL and if so, tmder what 
cirClnnstmtces. 105 It also avoids attswering whether the state can order expropriation 
of ptivately held land in these circmnstances. 106 Tims, the tights attd obligations of 
private property owners' in relati011 to hmneless society rnernbers remain tmclear_ 
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Conclusion 
There was no judicial review provision or Bill of Rights in the old South African 
Constitution. Instead, dm;ng the apruiheid era, the parliarnentary-based legal 
system "was essentially one of 'repressive law' [leaving black South Africm1s] 
deep[ly] alienation from the fotmal legal structmes. " 107 The Bill of Rights in the 
new South Africru1 Constitution was designed to restore faith in the rule of law by 
serving as a check on potential political govemment abuses. In Jaftha v. Schoemru1 
and others (2005) Justice Mokgoro wrote that section 26 of the Bill of Rights 
represents a "decisive break from the past,"10s m1d a recognition that "access to 
adequate housing is linked to dignity and self-worth. "' 09 Yet the Constitutional 
Comi' s approach to the enforcernent of socio-economic rights is cautious ru1d 
largely declarative rather than transfom1ative. 
Years after the Constitutional Comi's decision in Grootboom the people of that 
cmmmmity continued to live in intolerable conditions. 110 In a cotmtry that has some 
of the world's widest disparities in wealth, <md where approximately 60 percent of 
its children and more than 40 percent of the total population live in poverty, 111 the 
realization of adequate access to housing is an enormous task. "[T]he South African 
Human Rights Commission's annual reports on Econmnic and Social Rights 
consistently indicate[] ... a significant gap between the protnise of housing, medical 
care, basic infrastructure and the delivery thereof. "II! Thus the comi' s access to 
housing cases illustrate that judicial declaratimts of socio-econotnic rights do not 
necessarily translate into realization of those rights. 
One disillusi011ed South African scholar writes that for socio-econmnic relief to 
be meaningful it must be "capable of immediate impleruentation," especially where 
govennnent grants relief to the most desperate segment of society. 113 While the 
Constitutional Court is tmwilling to concede the itmnediacy point, in Fose v. 
Minister of Safety m1d Security ( 1997) it noted that: 'without effective remedies for 
breach, the values tmderlying m1d the right entrenched in the Constitution cmmot 
properly be upheld or enhanced .... [m1d t]he courts have a pmiicular responsibility 
... and are obliged to 'forge new tools' and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, 
to achieve this goal. " 114 But the court has not been forthcoming in fashiOlling new 
tools and innovative remedies in this m·ea 
The Constituti011al Comi, by ordering payment of compensatory dmnages to the 
landowner in Mudderklip directly affected by lm1d invasim1s, has taken only a small 
step in this direction. The ongoing debate within South Africa is whether the 
Constitutional Court can and should fashion more effective remedies to realize its 
orders involving socio-economic rights. 115 This debate over the proper role of the 
court in enforcing socio-econotnic rights goes to the very heart of the criticism about 
constitutionalizing socio-econotnic rights. 
In Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Acti011 Cmnpaign and Others 
(TAC)"6 the High Court's order included a structural interdict requiring the 
government to revise its policy about not providing the anti-viral drug Nevirapine to 
reduce mother-to-child tr::msmission of HN ru1d submit it to the court for review. 117 
The Constituti011al Comi upheld the ruling but substituted its own order declm;ng 
the _govennnent's refusal to provide appropriate treatment in public cliuics within its 
available resources tmreasonable, and a violation of the right of access to health 
car~. Rather than squarely address the Iawfuh1ess of the interdict order, the court 
~Voided the issue saying that the order was tmnecessary because "[t]be government 
as always respected and executed orders of this Court [ru1d t]here is no reason to 
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believe that it will not do so in the present case."'' 8 Articulating separation of 
powers concerns the Constitutional Court added: "Comis are ill-suited to adjudicate 
upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the comnnmity. " 119 
The govennnent in response to the court's mling alrnost immediately developed 
a program for pregnant HIV -positive women which inc! uded, when appropriate, 
access to Nevirpine. To many the cmni's ruling in the TAC case was a bold rnove 
with financial implications, and a far cry from its more deferential stance on access 
to health care in Soobramoney. But without the intemal and world-wide political 
pressme on the govemment generated by South African AIDS activists, one 
wonders whether the govenunent would have responded so quickly. 
Scholars remain divided when assessing the Constitutional Cotni's record on 
socio-economic rights during its first decade. Few question whether the comi can 
issue declaratory orders or, in extreme cases, exercise supervisory jmisdiction over 
the implementation of its orders. t:o Sorne scholars applaud the court while others 
express disappointment, especially about the court's record on enforcement of 
rights. The cmni's critics divide along two lines. One group argues for bold 
remedies like constitutional damages. 1: 1 Even bolder remedial suggestions include 
preventive damages1:: or reparation in kind, where the cmni might order the state 
"to provide appropriate remedial services for the benefit of a whole comrmmity that 
has suffered a long-tenn violation of its socio-economic rights."':.> 
A second group criticizes the cotni's approach to deciding socio-economic rights 
cases. High Cmni judge and law professor Detmis Davis, for example, argues that 
there is no suggestion in the court's jmisprudence of "a new legal method which 
could assist in the implementation of the promise held in ... the constitutional 
text. " 1:!-1 Instead the Constitutional Court prefers to rely on administrative law and 
the occasional, perftmctory application of international law. 1: 5 Ftniher, Davis 
argues, the cmni seems reluctant "to impose additional policy bmdens upon 
govemment" or hold the government accmmtable for the socio-economic rights it 
dechu·es, especially in cases involving the right to housing, health care and rights of 
children.':!() He concludes that for the moment, at least, South Africans seeking 
enforcement of their socio-economic rights may find quicker relief following the 
political rather than the judicial route. 1: 7 
There is some merit to Davis' argmnent. Many observers believe that the comi 
never would have ntled in favor of the litigants in TAC but for the political pressme 
generated world-wide by AIDS activists. Unlike TAC there are no major politicized 
housing organizations nationally or intemationally,. only small housing rights 
movements throughout Soud1 Africa Currently, these organizations do not have the 
visibility and political clout of South Africa's AIDS activists. 
Land invasions and questionable evictions continue throughout the cmmtry. 
Housing in some urban areas, like Cape Town, has becm11e tmaffordable or 
tmavailable for all but the very affluent. On one hand, wealthy Emopeans, 
Americans and South Africans push up the ptices of hmnes; m1 the other, poor 
people from rural areas and other African cmmtries continue to crowd into already 
overcrowded infonnal conununities or invade land to create new communities. 
Local residents cm1tinue to be displaced or tlueatened by floods and tmhealthy 
living conditim1s. Perhaps in the end, the political branches of govemment will be 
forced by both landowners and landless people to make access to adequate housing 
for the poorest of the poor more readily available. 
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Finally, there is an altemate less damning interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court's first decade. Arguably, the South African Constitutional Court, mindful of 
the argtn11ents against constitutionalizing socio-economic tights, is proceeding 
cautiously hopeful that the State will fulfill its constitutional obligations as declared 
by the court. Perhaps the court is giving the State time to stabilize its economy and 
more completely actualize its plans for progressive realization of socio-economic 
rights like access to housing. If so, then the court may be unwilling to act more 
forcefully until there is a longer record of inaction by the political branches of 
government. 
More impotiantly, it may be too early to judge the direction of the South African 
Constitutional Court. Perhaps another decade must pass and more fmmding comi 
members be replaced before m1y mem1ingful predictions of direction cm1 be made. 
In twenty years the court will have a longer record and more expertise m1d may be 
more willing to take bold steps, especially if the plight of residents like Mrs. 
Grootboom m1d her neighbors has not improved or worsened. 
But there also is a real danger in the court's delaying bolder action. South 
Africm1s may lose faith in the ability of the courts to enforce socio-ecm10mic rights 
and rights in general. Memories of the apartheid era abuses are still fresh in their 
minds. Judicial pronouncements of rights that are not actualized weaken the public's 
respect for the ntle of law. Perhaps the Constitutim1al Court judges will be 
motivated by the bolder actions of some high cmui judges. The High Cmui judge in 
Grootboom, for exm11ple, in directing the government to provide the evictees with 
adequate basic tet11porary shelter pursum1t to their right of access to adequate 
housing sf:elled out these requirements rather thm1 leave it to the State to 
detemline. 28 
Htunan rights advocates worldwide will be watching and hoping that South 
Africa succeeds in its transfonnative mission. South Africa and its Constitutional 
Cmui in particular, have an opportunity to serve as a model for other nations 
seeking to transfonu their societies into more egalitarim1 cmrununities that respect 
htunan rights. Time will tell whether it is possible to realize this goal while 
htunm1ely balm1cing competing constitutional rights. 
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